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 Many financial institutions employ outside portfolio managers to manage part or 
all of their investable assets.  These institutions include pension funds, private 
endowments (e.g., colleges and charities), and private trusts.  Pension funds are the 
largest and most likely organizations to employ several outside managers, each of whom 
manages a part of the overall portfolio.  In this paper we will use the pension fund 
manager as the prototype of the centralized decision-maker trying to optimally manage a 
set of decentralized decision-makers but the analysts is general. 
 If the centralized decision-maker (CDM) is a mean variance maximizer, the CDM 
could construct a portfolio using standard portfolio theory and estimates of mean return, 
variances, and covariances between the portfolios constructed by a group of decentralized 
managers.  However, this overall portfolio is unlikely to be optimum since the 
individually managed portfolios themselves were constructed without taking into account 
the portfolios of the other managers.  The purpose of this article is to set up a structure 
that leads to the optimum portfolio from the viewpoint of the CDM when there are 
multiple managers and their portfolios are constructed without reference to each other. 
 In the first section we will present a more detailed discussion of the problem.  We 
will then solve the problem for one active manager and multiple passive managers.  The 
model is then generalized to multiple active managers.  Next, we present solutions under 
a simplified structure of the return-generating process.  Finally, we discuss the 
complications when short sales are not allowed.   
I. Background 
In this section we discuss some background material on the pension investment 
problem and review the relevant literature.  The same considerations hold for private 
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endowments and trusts.  Most pension plans are managed by a centralized decision maker 
at a firm.  Most firms have one person who is principally in charge, although the ultimate 
responsibility rests with a committee, usually the board.  This CDM normally employs 
outside portfolio managers to construct active portfolios.  Index funds are generic 
products and we will assume the centralized decision maker can potentially select one or 
more of these.  The centralized decision maker’s task is fourfold: 1) decide how much to 
invest in each portfolio, 2) give the outside managers instructions that will result in their 
making optimum allocations from the point of view of the overall plan, 3) design 
incentive systems so that the managers will behave optimally, and 4) evaluate and select 
the portfolio managers.  In this paper we deal only with the first two of these problems.  
Throughout the paper, we assume that the portfolio managers will not provide the 
centralized decision maker with their return forecasts for individual securities, but will 
provide aggregate information about the portfolios they hold. 
 Aspects of this problem have previously been addressed by Treynor and Black 
(1974) and Sharpe (1981).  The Treynor Black article discussed the active passive split 
when the CAPM described the returns on the passive portfolio, short sales are allowed 
and the single-index model describes the return generating process.  Sharpe develops, 
with one active and one passive manager, the instructions for the active manager that will 
result in the active manager producing a globally optimal portfolio.  He assumes short 
sales are allowed and the variance covariance matrix is agreed on by all parties.  He also 
solves for the instructions to be given to the managers that results in a global optimal for 
the case of two managers following exactly the same set of securities where the 
centralized decision maker believes the best forecast of a securities alpha is a weighted 
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average of the two managers alphas and where these weights add to one.  In solving this 
problem he maintains the assumption of short sales allowed and agreement on the 
variance covariance matrix.  Sharpe (1981) could not obtain an exact myopic solution for 
the case of non-overlapping securities.  Our analysis differs from Sharpe (1981) in that 
we generalize to N managers, have no requirement that they hold the same securities and 
by employing a multi-factor model can arrive at simple rules for forming myopic 
optimum portfolios and understanding the weight placed on each security in that 
portfolio. 
II. Separation with a single active and multiple passive manager 
In this section of the paper we will assume that a centralized decision maker (CDM) 
exists who hires a single active manager.  We will shortly expand the case to several 
active managers.  We will assume the following: 1) the CDM is a mean variance decision 
maker, 2) the CDM believes a multi-index model describes the return structure for 
securities and all indexes in the multi-index model are tradable. 
The second point requires some clarification.  The CDM believes that returns can be 
described as being generated by a set of indexes (not necessarily orthogonal) that the 
CDM can take positions in as passive portfolios.  For example, this is consistent with a 
belief that the return on securities is a function of the market return, the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks, and/or the return on a portfolio of value or growth stocks.  The 
CDM wishes to consider these sources of risk in making the optimum mean variance 
decision.  For expositional reasons we will analyze the CDM’s problem with a two index 
model though the solution easily generalizes to any number of indexes. 
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A. The CDM’s problem 
 We start by examining the optimum decision the CDM would make if the CDM 
had all the information that is available to the active managers.  As mentioned earlier, we 
believe the CDM would not be able to obtain risk adjusted return forecasts for individual 
securities from the active manager, but for the moment we examine the optimum decision 
as if the CDM has such information.  We will also assume that the CDM does not have 
perfect faith in the return forecasts of the active manager.  This implies that the CDM will 
take positions in the passive portfolios for two reasons, to obtain diversification across 
securities so that the portfolio is mean variance efficient, and to eliminate some of the 
lack of reliability in the analyst’s estimates. 
 In order to specify the return generating process, define 
1. iR  is the return on stock i 
2. FR  is the risk free rate of interest 
3. BA RR  ,  is the return on index A and index B respectively 
4. iBiA ββ  ,  is the sensitivity of stock i to indexes A and B 
5. 22  , BA σσ  is the variance of the return on indexes A and B 
6. 2eiσ  is the residual risk of stock i from the two-index model 
7. iα  is the risk adjusted return on security i 
8. ie  is the residual return for security i 
9. The superscript D designates that the decision is from the point of view of the 
CDM. 
Then the return generating process is 
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( ) ( ) iFBiBFAiAiFi eRRRRRR +−+−+=− ββα    (1) 
Assume that the CDM had access to the excess return forecasts )( iα of the active 
manager.  Furthermore, assume the CDM believes that the best estimate of risk-adjusted 
excess return is an average of the analysts’ forecasts and the value that would occur in 
equilibrium namely zero.  Thus, we define the excess risk adjusted return that the CDM 
would use as i
D
i Wαα = where W is set by CDM between 0 and 1. 
 To solve this problem and assuming short sales, the CDM can use the standard 
first order conditions.  The investments that can be selected are the N individual securities 
and the two indexes.  The first order condition for security i is 
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2  for i=1,…N+2  (2) 
Where 
1. N is the number of securities entering into the decision making process 
2. DiZ  is a number proportional to the optimal weight which the CDM would place 
in security i 
3. A, B designate passive portfolios. 
If the return generating process described in equation (1) is an accurate 
description of returns and we recognize that the indexes need not be orthogonal, then we 
can define the variance and covariance between individual securities as 
222222 2 eiABiBiABiBAiAi σσββσβσβσ +++=    for i=1,…,N 
ABjAiBABjBiABjBiBAjAiAij σββσββσββσββσ +++= 22  for i=1…N j=1,…N 
        ji ≠  
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For the N+1 and N+2 securities (the indexes), a simpler form exists.  For example, for 
index A the variance is 2Aσ  and the covariance with index B is ABσ  and the covariance 
with individual securities is 
ABiBAiAiA σβσβσ += 2  
Employing these relationships with the first order condition (2), we get for security i 
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and for the indexes 
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Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (3) and simplifying, we get 
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The fraction of the funds the CDM would invest in any security if he or she had full 
information is 
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We will solve for DAZ  and 
D
BZ  shortly.  They will be solved for by analyzing the problem 
as an allocation of funds across two passive and an optimum active portfolio.  However, 
to solve for the optimum amount in security i we consider the active portfolio denoted by 
P as a separate portfolio and look at the optimum composition of this portfolio before we 
allocate across all three portfolios.  We can treat the design of P as a separate portfolio 
because from equation (6), DiZ  is not a function of AZ  or BZ . 
 The amount to invest in security i in the optimal active portfolio from the 
viewpoint of the CDM is simply 
21
2
ej
D
j
N
j
ei
D
i
σ
α
σ
α
=
Σ
          (7) 
Recall that i
D
i wαα = .  With this substitution the optimal composition from the point of 
view of the CDM equals 
21
2
ej
j
N
j
ei
i
σ
α
σ
α
=
Σ
. 
B. Optimum active portfolio 
The CDM can ensure that the active manager will hold the optimal active 
portfolio from the point of view of the CDM simply by instructing the active manager to 
rank all stocks by 2
ei
i
σ
α  and to hold them in that proportion.1  This simple instruction 
ensures that the active manager will turn over to the CDM the same active portfolio that 
                                                 
1 If the decentralized manager were simply told to form the optimum active portfolio assuming that he 
could hold the passive portfolio, he would get the same result as following the direction from the central 
manager. 
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the CDM would hold if all the security estimates were supplied directly to the CDM.  
Optimization for the active portfolio is reached without the active manager giving up 
private information. 
Of course the CDM still has the problem of deciding what fraction of funds to 
place in the active portfolio and each of the passive portfolios. 
C. Solving the aggregate allocation problem 
Denote the characteristics of the active portfolio by the subscript P.  Then from 
the viewpoint of the CDM, ignoring for the moment any difficulty of getting information, 
the problem can be formulated and solved using the following first order conditions. 
=−+−+ )()( FBPBFAPA
D
P RRRR ββα  
2222222 )2( BPB
D
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D
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P ZZZ σβσβσσββσβσβ +++++  
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D
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BABPABPB
D
PFB ZZZRR σσσβσβ +++=− 22 )(  
 These are standard first order conditions, and if everything but the Z’s are known 
the optimum solution can be reached by solving three simultaneous equations or by using 
any one of a number of standard software packages.  To obtain these estimates, the CDM 
needs to request the active manager’s estimate of the alpha for the active portfolio, the 
residual risk of the active portfolio and the active portfolio sensitivities to the two 
indexes.  These are the types of estimates the active manager should be willing to supply 
since they are aggregate portfolio values rather than individual security values.2  The 
                                                 
2 As stated earlier, we are assuming that the CDM and the active manager are employing identical estimates 
of the β ’s and residual risks but not return characteristics of each security.  This could come about 
naturally if the risk parameters were estimated from the same commercial service (e.g., BARA or 
Wilshire).  The CDM could either specify that decentralized managers use a particular commercial service 
or directly supply the risk parameters for the assumption of our model to hold. 
 9
CDM needs to estimate the expected return above the riskless note and risk on the index 
funds, the covariance between the passive funds, and the amount of weight (W) to put on 
the active manager’s estimates. 
 We have now presented a set of conditions under which a centralized decision-
maker can optimize portfolio composition while employing one active manager.  The 
next problem to solve is the case of several active, decentralized managers. 
III. Multiple active managers 
The analysis generalizes to multiple active managers whether these managers follow 
some or all securities in common or follow independent sections of the market.3  For 
simplicity we will solve for the case of two active managers, but the analysis easily 
generalizes.  Assume that the CDM has different confidence in the forecasts of each 
manager and believes that all the managers α  estimates are too extreme but that the 
appropriate estimate is some combination of them.4  If we designate the weight the CDM 
puts on the estimate prepared by manager 1 as 1W  and manager 2 as 2W .  Then 
2211 ii
D
i WW ααα += .  Once again it is necessary for the CDM to supply estimates of 
betas and residual variances to all active managers either directly or by specifying a 
service such as BARA.  Since 2eiσ  is supplied by the CDM to all managers, it is common 
and 
2
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+=         (8) 
                                                 
3 Sharpe (1981) did not reach an explicit solution in the case where only some securities were in common 
across active managers. 
4 Implicit in what follows is if only one manager follows a security, the CDM assumes the best estimate of 
the second manager’s alpha if he/she followed it would be zero. 
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 Earlier we showed that 2
ei
D
i
α
α
was proportioned to the optimum amount that the 
CDM wished to place in security i if all alphas were supplied to the CDM.  The issue we 
addressed in this section is the instruction to give to the individual managers and the 
correct proportions to invest in each active portfolio so that the CDM, by combining the 
portfolios of the active managers, ends up with a fraction of the active portfolio 
proportional to 2
ei
D
i
σ
α  in security i. 
 Summing both sides of equation (8) across all securities 
2
2
22
1
12
ei
iW
ei
iW
ei
D
i
σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
Σ+Σ=Σ       (9) 
If the CDM instructs each manager to rank each security, he or she follows by a 2
ei
i
σ
α  
and to place a fraction of money in each security proportional to this ratio we can define 
the fraction any manager (e.g., manager 1) places in any security as 
2
1
1
1
2
ej
jN
j
i
ei
σ
α
σ
α
=
Σ
. 
 We can then derive some of the attributes of the portfolio which manager 1 (or 
any manager) will hold. 
 The risk-adjusted excess return on the portfolio held by manager 1 is 
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and the residual risk of this active portfolio is 
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Taking the ratio of (10) and (11) yields 
2
1
2
1
1
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P
j σ
α
σ
α
Σ=         (12) 
Furthermore, KP1β where the subscript K is a counter, indication either index A or index B 
equals 
2
2
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j
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σ
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Rearranging and substituting equation (12) yields 
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Having developed these expressions, we can now show that there exists an allocation 
across the active portfolios along with the instruction to the individual managers to hold 
stocks in proportion 2
ei
i
σ
α
, which results in an overall optimum to the CDM.  
Substituting equation (12) into (9) yields 
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+=      (15) 
 Recall that the individual portfolio manager has been instructed to form a 
portfolio by holding securities proportional to the ratio of excess return to residual risk.  
Recognizing this instruction and using equation (12) to simplify the denominator 
2
1
1
2
1
1
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P
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i
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σ
α
σ
α
=        (16) 
Utilizing equation (8) and dividing both sides of equation (8) by 
2
ePD
D
P
σ
α
, the correct 
amount in security i in the active portfolios from the point of view of the CDM is 
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σ
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σ
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  (17) 
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Since
2
ePD
D
P
σ
α
 can be computed from equation (15), if the CDM obtains 1Pα  and 
2
1ePσ from manager 1, and 2Pα and 
2
2ePσ  from manager 2, he or she can determine 
optimum proportions among active managers.  The centralized decision maker simply 
holds a weighted average of each active manager’s portfolio where the weights are 
 
1
2
2
2
22
1
1
1
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1
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2
2
2
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1
1
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2
2
W
eP
PW
eP
PW
eP
P





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

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
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σ
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σ
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 respectively. 
  
 In addition, the CDM can determine the split between the aggregate active 
portfolio and the passive portfolios using any standard portfolio algorithm by solving the 
portfolio problem using the 2 and , , , ePPBPA αββα  from each manager and estimating 
the weights, the excess return, risk of the passive funds, and the covariance between 
passive funds centrally.  This is done using the overall active portfolio and two passive 
portfolios using the equations in Section II C. 
IV. Orthogonal Indexes 
Up to this point we have assumed that the indexes are not orthogonal.  The 
advantage of this is that it allows the passive portfolios to be portfolios that exist in the 
market such as small stocks, the S&P Index, growth stocks, etc.  However, if we are 
willing to assume orthogonal indexes the allocation across active and passive managers is 
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simplified.  With orthogonal indexes, the covariance among indexes is zero, and the first 
order condition for the passive index is simpler.  For passive index A equation (4) 
becomes 
22
A
D
AAjA
D
jjFA ZZRR σσβ +Σ=−  
Solving for DAZ  
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Substituting for DjZ  from equation (6) yields 
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Expressing 
2
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D
j
σ
α
 in terms of the two active portfolios 
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Finally, using equation (10): 
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Thus, the centralized decision maker can determine the total Z and the split between each 
of the passive portfolios and each of the active portfolios using a simple formula if all 
managers provide their estimates of βσα  and 2 , ePP  on each index, and the centralized 
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decision maker estimates the W’s and excess return and risk on the index.  The active 
managers also need to have common risk measures, iβ ’s and 2eiσ  for all securities under 
consideration. 
V. Short sales not allowed 
The final issue to examine is whether a rule can be worked out if short sales are 
not allowed.  The answer is yes, but only under very restrictive conditions.  From the 
point of view of the centralized decision maker, if there is a single active manager, then 
the iZ in a particular security is 2
ei
iwD
iZ
σ
α
=  if all the passive portfolios are held long.  
Using the analysis presented earlier along with Kuhn Tucker conditions, an explicit 
solution exists.  The simple form for DiZ  allows a construction of a simple rule for the 
active manager.  Select all securities with positive iα , and the previously presented 
analysis follows. 
What happens if one or more of the passive portfolios is short-sold in an optimum 
solution?  If the CDM allows a shorting of passive portfolios, possibly by using futures, 
but forbids short sales of securities in the active portfolio, then a single ranking by 
2
ei
i
σ
α
 is optimum where all stocks with positive alphas are held in proportion to this 
ratio.  Finally, if all but one index is held long, repetitive substitution will result in a set 
of first order conditions that are solvable as in the simple rules of Elton, Gruber & 
Padberg (1976). 
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If there are multiple active managers, even more stringent assumptions are 
necessary to obtain an optimum solution.  To understand the problem, consider the case 
where manager 1 forecasts 01 >iα  and manager 2 forecasts 02 <iα  where the absolute 
value of 2iα  is greater than 1iα  and the CDM puts equal weights on the estimates of each 
manager.  In this case the CDM would want to hold zero in security i.  However, manager 
1 will hold positive proportions and without short sales, manager 2 will hold zero rather 
than short sell.  No combination will provide an optimum to the CDM. 
The only exception to this scenario is the case where the centralized manager 
wishes to place no weight on a forecast of a negative alpha.  This implies that the CDM 
believes the managers have no ability to forecast below normal returns but have some 
ability on the upside.  In the case where 01 >iα  and 02 <iα , the CDM would want to 
use 11 iW
D
i αα =  and, providing all passive portfolios are held long or short sales of 
passive portfolios are allowed, the analysis outlined above goes through with each active 
manager not allowed to have short sales. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this article we have shown that under realistic conditions when short sales are 
allowed, it is possible, and indeed quite easy, for a centralized decision maker to form an 
optimal overall portfolio while employing multiple outside portfolio managers.  Outside 
managers should be willing to supply the information the CDM needs since it does not 
require them to reveal private information on individual securities.  Managers should be 
hesitant to reveal information on individual securities, since it is useful for multiple 
portfolios and to reveal it opens up the possibility of resale of the information. 
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Unfortunately, a general solution does not exist when short sales are not allowed.  
This is a problem ignored in the past literature.  While we cannot present a general 
optimum model when short sales are not allowed, we have pointed out conditions under 
which the models we developed for decentralized management holds when short sales are 
not allowed.  If there is a single active manager to combine with passive indexes, a 
solution exists if it is optimum for the manager to place some funds in each index and/or 
the indexes (as opposed to the securities) can be sold short.  If the indexes cannot be sold 
short, a solution still exists as long as one and only one index is not held long. 
In the case of multiple active managers, the analysis in the previous paragraph 
holds as long as a forecast of a negative alpha by a manager is taken to convey no 
information and the manager is simply told not to hold securities with negative alpha. 
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